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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
The techniques that the decision maker uses to reach a
decision are intuitive judgement and mathematic computation.
To make decisions based on a human being's intuitive
judgement is the most practiced decision process,
especially in the highest management level. However, making
decisions based on intuitive judgement can be dangerous and
unreliable since real world problems are usually out of any
individual's comprehension.
We may observe that decision makers often agree with
the logical procedure of decision analysis but still feel
uncomfortable at an intuitive level with its implications.
Because human beings fear making the wrong decision,
therefore, some people find decision making under uncertain-
ty difficult. Disappointment has important implications for
the study of decision making under uncertainty. Although
the axioms of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (19) are the
cornerstones of decision analysis, they can not be expected
to hold if preference has not been calculated over all
attributes of interest to the decision maker. A disappoint-
ment model built by David E. Bell (4) can explain the
implications of psychological reaction — disappointment —
in decision-making situations, and can provide a preference
model for decision makers to reach a rational decision.
1.2 LITERATURE SURVEY
Some general references to decision theory at a level
roughly comparable to this report are: Drucker, P. (1956,
Section 2.3); Greenwood, W. T. (1965 and 1969, Section 2.2);
Hamburg, Morris (1977, Sections 2.4 and 2.5); Jedamus , P.
and Frame (1969, Section 2.3); Wasserman, P. and Silander
(1964, Section 2.2); and White, J. A., Agee and Case (1984,
Sections 2.4 and 2.5). Other general references of interest
include Fishburn, Peter C. (1970); Keeney, Ralph L.(1982);
Lindley, D. V. (1973); Morris, William T. (1968); and White,
D. J. (1970) .
With regard to utility theory, some key historical
references are Fishburn, Peter C. (1970, Section 2.6); and
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, Section 2.6.1). The
history of utility theory and advanced applications are
discussed in Arrow, K.J. (1951); Kahneman , D. and A. Tversky
(1979); and Savage, L. J. (1954). These references deal at
least in part with the axiomatic development and application
of utility.
Some other aspects of utility theory include risk
aversion, which is discussed in Arrow, K. J. (1971); Crouch,
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Edmund A. C. and Wilson (1982); Dyer, J. S. and Sarin
(1982); Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979); Pratt, John W.
(1964); Ross, Stephen A. (1981); and Stone, B. K. (1973).
For the study of this report — the disappointment
reaction in decision making under uncertainty — the primary
references used are Allais, Maurice (1953); Bell, David E.
(1985); Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979); and von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1953)
1.3 REPORT ORGANIZATION
A disappointment model built by David Bell is
introduced in this study. It is not well known and deserves
wider readership. Chapter 1 gives the purpose of this study
and the references used in this study. Chapter 2 briefly
explains the definition and history of decision making, and
reviews the methodology and procedure of decision analysis.
Chapter 3 represents this disappointment model and
investigates the implications of psychological reactions —
disappointment and elation — in decision situations.
Finally the conclusions are given in chapter 4.
CHAPTER II
DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
2 .
1
DEFINITION OF DECISION MAKING
The decision making process involves getting the facts
about a problem, weighing them against specified criteria,
and then deciding which of several alternatives to select.
Decisions play an important role in our everyday lives,
thus life is a constant sequence of decision-making
situations. Every action we take, with the exception of a
few involuntary physiological actions, such as breathing,
can be thought of as a decision. Of course, most of these
decisions are quite minor because the consequences involved
are not very important. However, some involve millions of
dollars or even life and death. Indeed, decision making may
constitute one of the highest forms of human activities.
2.2 HISTORY OF DECISION MAKING
Decision making theories and methods have dominated the
management literature in the past decade. An investigation
by Greenwood (9) mentioned that before 1950, decision making
was not used in management literature and was not given much
importance. Management was more inclined towards human
relations, organization theory and economic analysis, than
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towards decision theory. Later, more emphasis was laid on
business decision making. Greenwood added that decision
making and methods have been developed in attempt to resolve
particular management problems and from the perspective of
particular academic disciplines, especially psychology,
sociology, mathematics, statistics, and logic. That is why
the literature on decision making is scattered and as yet
not properly gathered or integrated.
Between 1945 and 1948, an exhaustive survey was made on
the literature of decision making by Paul Wasserman and Fred
S. Silander (20). The findings were published in a summa-
rized form by Cornell University in 1958 under a McKinsey
Foundation grant entitled Decision Making — An Annotated
Bibliography
. The findings revealed that decision making
was used in small groups concerning psychological studies of
individual, group and leadership factors. The idea of
management decision making was originated by psychologists,
mathematicians, and statisticians; its methods being
derived from the fields of mathematics and statistics.
2.3 HOW TO MAKE A DECISION
Peter Drucker (7) said that decisions will always have
to be based on judgement. They will always remain decisions
for a future which will continue to be unpredictable. They
will always entail risks. Nevertheless, a decision maker by
following fairly simple steps can greatly improve his
performance. There are basically four steps involved in
decision making and they may be enumerated as follows:
1. Defining the problem: What kind of problem have
we to solve? What is its critical factor? When do
we have to solve it? What is the cost involved in
its solution?
2. Defining expectations: What do we want to gain by
solving it?
3. Developing alternative solutions: Which of several
plans offers the surest way to avoid unexpected
outcomes
.
4. Knowing what to do with the decision after it is
reached, i.e. implementation of the decision.
Attention to these rules will help the decision maker
avoid the three most common pitfalls in the making of
decisions. These are:
1
.
Finding the right answer for the wrong problem-few
things are as useless.
2. Making the decision at the wrong time.
3. Making decisions that do not result in action.
Paul Jedamus and Robert Frame (12) explained that if
the procedure discussed above is followed step by step, the
decision made will be the best, not with certainty but with
higher probability (confidence) .
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2.4 STRUCTURE OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROBLEM
The decision problem under study may be represented by
a model in terms of the following elements:
1. The decision maker. The agent charged with the
responsibilityf or making the decision. The
decision maker is viewed as an entity and may be a
single individual, a corporation, a government
agency, etc.
2. Alternative courses of action. The decision
involves a selection among two or more alternative
courses of action, referred to simply as "acts".
The problem is to choose the best of these alterna-
tive acts. Sometimes the decision maker's problem
is to choose the best of alternative "strategies",
where each strategy is a decision rule indicating
which act should be taken in response to a specific
type of experimental or sample information.
3. Events. Occurrences that affect the achievement of
the objectives. These are viewed as lying outside
the control of the decision maker, who does not
know for certain which event will occur. The
events constitute a mutually exclusive and complete
set of outcomes; hence, one and only one of them
can occur. Events are also referred to as "states
of nature", or "states of the world".
4. Payoffs. A measure of net benefit to be received
by the decision maker under particular circums-
tances. These payoffs are summarized in a payoff
table or payoff matrix, which displays the conse-
quences of each action selected and each event that
occurs
.
5. Uncertainty. The indef initeness concerning which
events or states of nature will occur. This
uncertainty is indicated in terms of probabilities
assigned to events. A matrix decision model with
general symbolism, adapted from Morris Hamburg
(11), is given in Table 2.1.
The symbolism employed is defined as follows:
A. = an alternative or strategy under the decision
maker's control, where J = 1,2,..., n.
S = a state of nature that can occur after
alternative A is chosen, where k = 1, 2,..., m.
J
G = the outcome of choosing alternative A and having
state S occur.
k
V(e ) = the value of outcome © , which may be in terms
J k J k
'
of dollars, time, distance, or utility.
p^ = the probability that state S will occur. It is
assumed that the probability of a particular
state occurring does not depend on the alterna-
tive chosen by the decision maker.
P, ^2 Pk P
.
J ^ ^2 ^ s^
*i V(e^J ^'^2' v(^,) ^'^J
\ V<^.> V<^2' ^'^J ^'^J
i
A.
J
v(e^,) v(e^^)
^'"j.'
A_^ ^<^.' v<^,2'
^'^„J v{e )ntn
Table 2.1. A matrix decision model with general symbolism.
2.5 DIFFERENT SITUATIONS UNDER WHICH ONE HAS TO DECIDE
There are three situations under which one has to
decide, as explained by Archer (2):
1. Decision under certainty
2. Decision under risk
3. Decision under uncertainty
'«5W"-'
2.5.1 Decision Under Certainty
It is reasonable to assume in many decision situations
that only one state of nature is relevant. Then, the
decision maker assumes this single state will occur with
certainty, i.e. with probability = 1.0. This kind of case
is termed a decision under assumed certainty.
In terms of the matrix decision model, a decision under
assumed certainty would appear in Table 2.2.
1.0
A ^
J
s
A
1
V{0^ )
^
v(e^)
A,
J
v(e.)
A
n
v(e )
n
Table 2.2. The matrix model for a decision under certainty
In this situation, the payoffs resulting from the
selection of a particular strategy is known. It is assumed
10
that the payoffs resulting from the decision can be precise-
ly measured; in other words, only one state of nature is
assumed to exist. Prediction is involved, based on assumed
outcomes. The assumption of certainty simplifies the
decision but ignores variations in condition which often
exist, leading to improper decisions.
Exampl e :
A man wants to invest one thousand dollars for three
years. From the present trend of market interest rate, he
can choose either of two alternatives:
1. Invest S 1000 at 5% compounded annually for three
years, or
2. Invest $ 1000 at 5.5% compounded annually for two
years and for the third year at 4% compounded annually.
The criterion for selection of a particular alternative is
to maximize the interest earned. The solution to the above
problem according to this criterion is as follows:
Alternative 1 :
F = Future value of the deposit after n interest periods
= P(l+i)"
where,
P = present amount
i = interest rate per period
n = number of interest period
F = a future sum of money
11
The future value of the deposit after three years using this
relation is:
Fj = 1000(1+0.05)^
= 1000(1.05)^
= 1000(1.168)
= S 1168
Alternative 2 :
The future value of the deposit after two years is:
F^ = 1000(1+0.055)^
= 1000(1.055)^
= 1000(1.113)
= $ 1113
For the third year, he has:
P = $ 1113
i = 4%
n = 1
The future value of deposit after the third year is:
F^ = 1113(1+0.04)'
= 1113(1.04)
= S 1157.52
From these calculations the first alternative will be
selected, since the future value of deposit after three
years is greater than from the second alternative.
12
2.5.2 Decision Under Risk
A decision situation is called a decision under risk
when the decision maker elects to consider several states
and the probabilities of their occurrence are explicitly
stated. In some decision problems, the probability values
may be objectively known from historical records or objec-
tively determined from analytical calculations.
In this case, the decision maker must review the payoff
matrix resulting from the various states of nature, along
with their probabilities of occurrence. In order to arrive
at a decision, the payoff is weighed by the associated prob-
ability. The expected value of a strategy is the sum of the
payoffs, each multiplied by (i.e. weighted by) its respec-
tive probability of occurrence. The appropriate decision is
to select the strategy with optimum expected value (largest,
for maximization of the payoff unit) . The matrix model for
a decision under risk is as same as Table 2.1.
Example :
The payoffs mentioned below are profits. The criterion
for selection of a strategy is to maximize the profit.
There are three states of nature which occur with probabili-
ties (0.25, 0.5, 0.25) as shown in Table 2.3.
The strategies represent different inventory levels, i.e.
Strategies: Inventory levels
(200) (250) (300) (350) (400)
13
vaimrs
0.25 0.5 0.25 Expected
ValuesA^S. ^ ^2 = 3
\ 100 100 50 87.5
*2 90 120 100 107.5
^3 70 120 140 105.0
\ 40 90 190 102.5
h 50 160 65.0
Table 2.3. Payoff (profit) matrix
For a particular strategy, the profit is different for the
several states of nature as shown above. As mentioned in
the beginning, the profit is to be maximized, therefore, a
strategy with maximum average profit will be chosen.
The optimal strategy is therefore the stocking of 250
units, for the expected value (the average profit from such
a decision in the long run) is higher, 107.5, than for any
other stategy, as summarized in the right portion of Table
2.3.
2.5.3 Decision Under Uncertainty
A decision situation where several states are possible
and sufficient information is not available to assign proba-
14
bility values to their occurrence is termed a decision
under uncertainty. In this case, the possible criteria for
selecting the optimum strategy are:
1. The Laplace Criterion: If one can not assign
probabilities to the states, the states should be considered
as equally probable.
Bxampl e :
Applying this criterion to the previous example of
Table 2.3, the probability value assigned to each of the
three states is 1/3. Then,
E(Aj) = 100(1/3) + 100(1/3) + 50(1/3)
= 83.33
^if^^) = 90(1/3) + 120(1/3) + 100(1/3)
= 103.33
E(A^) = 70(1/3) + 120(1/3) + 140(1/3)
= 110.00
E(AJ = 40(1/3) + 90(1/3) + 190(1/3)
= 106.67
E(A^) = 0(1/3) + 50(1/3) + 160(1/3)
= 70.00
and A^ would be chosen, that is, the stoclcing of 300 units.
2. The Maximin Criterion: The matrix model is
expressed in terms of profit. The decision maker regards
nature as an antagonist and expects the worst possible
15
outcome (the smallest profit) . He therefore selects the
strategy that will yield the greatest minimum profit.
Exampl e :
Applying this criterion to the previous example of
Table 2.3, thus, alternative A with 90 maximin value is
selected as the alternative that will maximize the minimum
present worth value that could occur.
3. The Minimax Criterion: The matrix model is
expressed in terms of loss. The decision maker expects the
worst possible outcome (the greatest loss) , and selects the
strategy that will yield the smallest loss. Both criteria 2
and 3 are the most conservative (pessimistic) decision
rules
.
Exampl e :
Applying this criterion to the previous example of
Table 2.3, thus, alternative A with 100 minimax value is
selected as the alternative that will minimize the maximum
present worth value that could occur.
4. The Maximax Criterion: The matrix model is usually
expressed in terms of profit. In this case, the decision
maker therefore selects the strategy with the highest
possible payoff.
16
Exampl e :
Applying this criterion to the previous example of
Table 2.3, thus, alternative A with 190 maximax value is
selected as the alternative that will maximize the maximum
present worth value that could occur.
5. The Minimin Criterion: The matrix model is
expressed in terms of loss. In this case, an optimistic
philosophy of choice is to select the strategy that affords
the opportunity to obtain the smallest loss. Both criteria
4 and 5 are optimistic decision rules.
Exampl e :
Applying this criterion to the previous example of
Table 2.3, thus, alternative A,, with minimin value is
o
selected as the alternative that will minimize the minimum
present worth value that could occur.
6. Hurwicz Criterion: In this case, the decision
maker uses the weighted average of the minimum and the
maximum payoffs to select the best strategy. Weights are
designed to reflect the decision maker's subjective degree
of pessimism. The weight given to minimum payoff is chosen
arbitrarily by decision maker.
Exampl e :
Suppose the decision maker concerned with the example
17
problem of Table 2.3 was a middle-of-the-road type of person
and assigns a = 0.5. Then,
Hj for Aj is 100(0.5) + 50(0.5) = 75
H^ for Aj is 120(0.5) + 90(0.5) = 105
Hj for Aj is 140(0.5) + 70(0.5) = 105
H^ for A, is 190(0.5) + 40(0.5) = 115
4 4
H^ for A„ is 160(0.5) + 0(0.5) = 80b 5
Choosing the maximum of these values is to select
alternative A with Hurwicz value 115.
7. Savage Criterion (Minimax Regret): This criterion,
proposed by L. J. Savage, introduces and defines a quantity
termed regret. A matrix consisting of regret values is
first developed. Then the maximum regret value for each
alternative A. is determined, and the alternative associated
with the minimum regret value is chosen from the set of
maximum regret values.
Exampl e :
Applying the Savage criterion to the example of Table
2.3, the regret matrix given in Table 2.4 is obtained. The
maximum regret values are 140, 90, 50, 60 and 100 for
alternatives A^ , A^ , A^ , A^ and A^ , respectively. Thus, the
minimum of these values is 50, and alternative A would be
preferred.
18
^^^ s
1 ^2 ^
Maximum
regret value
^ 20 140 140
^2 10 90 90
^3 30 50 50
^4 60 30 60
^5 100 70 30 100
Table 2.4. Regret matrix for the minimax regret example
2.6 DECISION MAKING BASED ON EXPECTED UTILITY
In the decision analysis discussed up to this point,
the criteria of choice were the maximization of expected
monetary value. This criterion can be interpreted as a test
of preferredness that selects as the optimal act the one
that yields the greatest long-run average profit. That is,
in a decision problem, the optimal act is the one that would
result in the largest long-run average profit if the same
decision had to be made repeatedly under identical environ-
mental conditions. In general, in such decision-making
situations, as the number of looetitions becomes large, the
observed average payoff approaches the theoreti-al expected
19
payoff. However, many of the most important personal and
business decisions are made under unique sets of conditions,
and in some of these occasions it may not be realistic to
think in terms of many repetitions of the same decision
situation.
In all of the foregoing discussion the payoffs and
losses have been expressed in monetary terms. This is not
always the case; it is easy to think of examples in which
the consequences of a decision are nonmonetary. The conse-
quences may involve quantities of a good or a service. If
the good or the service has a known monetary value, then the
payoffs can be expressed in dollars, pounds, francs, or
whatever. Otherwise, the decision maker has to build
another criterion for nonmonetary decision situations to
express and to select the best alternative.
It is reasonable to depart sometimes from the criterion
of maximizing expected monetary values in making decisions.
One's decisions will clearly depend upon one's attitude
toward risk, which in turn will depend on a combination of
factors such as one's level of assets, liking or distaste
for gambling, and psycho-emotional constitution.
To recapitulate, Morris Hamburg (11) summarized the
problem concerning decision making in problems involving
payoffs that depend upon risky outcomes. Monetary payoffs
are sometimes inappropriate as a measuring device, and it
20
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appears appropriate to substitute some other set of values
or "numeraire", which reflects the decision maker's attitude
toward risk. A clever approach to this problem — the
maximization of expected utility value — has been furnished
by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, who developed the so-called
Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility measure. The concept
of this approach is a focus for this report.
Essentially, the theory of utility makes it possible to
measure the relative value to a decision maker of the
payoffs, or consequences, in a decision problem. In a
general sense, the payoff represents the consequence to the
decision maker of taking a particular action and having a
particular state of nature occur. This includes all aspects
of the consequences, monetary or otherwise.
2.6.1 Axioms Of Utility
Basically, what is needed is an objective function
which aggregates all the individual objectives and an atti-
tude toward risk. In decision analysis, such an objective
function is referred to as a utility function. Using the
axioms of utility, it is possible for an individual to
assess a utility function.
Formally, a utility function U can be interpreted in
terms of a preference relationship; thus u(X) , the utility
of the consequence X, indicates the desirability of X
21
relative to all other consequences. The four basic axioms
of utility are as follows, assuming X is measured in dollars
or other tangible goods:
1. If payoff X is preferred to payoff X
,
then
if X is prefe]
UiX^) < U(X^) ;
and if neither is preferred to the other, then
mx^) = U(Xj) .
2. If you are indifferent between (a) receiving payoff
X for certain and (b) taking a bet or lottery in
which you receive payoff X with probability p and
payoff X^ with probability 1-p, then
y(Xj ) = pmx^) + (1-p) £;{X^)
3. If an individual prefers X to X and X to X
, he
will also prefers X^ to X^ . This is referred to as
the principle of transitivity. It extends also to
indifference relationships.
4. If a payoff or consequence of an act is replaced by
another, and one is indifferent between the former
and new consequences, then one should also be
indifferent between the old and new acts. This is
22
often referred to as the principle of substitution.
5. The utility function is bounded. This means that
utility can not increase or decrease without limit.
As a practical matter, this simply means that the
range of possible monetary values is limited. For
example, at the lower end the range may be limited
by a bankruptcy condition.
It is important to note that a utility function is not
unique, even for a specific individual, and in any event a
person's utility function will not necessarily remain the
same over time. If, for a particular person, a function U
satisfies the above axioms, then the function W = c + dU
also satisfies the axioms, where c and d are constants with
d greater than 0. In words, it is said that a utility
function is only unique up to a positive linear transforma-
tion.
Following directly from the foregoing axioms of utility
function, alternatives with higher expected utilities should
be preferred to those with lower expected utilities.
It should be emphasized that the development and
discussion of utility theory presented in this report are
only a brief, rough development and discussion of the most
important points of the theory of utility, although it will
suffice for the purpose of this report.
23
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2.6.2 Risk In Decision-Making Problems
The importance of risk to decision making is attested
by its position in decision theory (Allais 1953; Arrow
1965)
,
by its standing in managerial ideology (Peters and
Waterman 1982)
, and by the burgeoning interest in risk
assessment and managemant (Crouch and Wilson 1982) .
Studies of utility commonly make hypotheses about
properties of the utility function that should be hold for
"most people". These studies generally assume that people
are risk averse in monetary gambles and that the extent of
their risk aversion (15) decreases as they become wealthier
(16) .
Early treatments by Pratt (1964), Arrow (1965) and
others, as well as more recent work (Ross 1981), assumed
that individual human decision makers are risk averse, that
is, that when faced with one alternative having a given
outcome with certainty, and a second alternative which is a
gamble but has the same expected value as the first, an
individual will choose the certain outcome rather than the
gamble.
Suppose you are offered the following choice: you
receive three oranges for sure or receive a lottery in which
you get eight oranges with a 0.5 chance and zero oranges
with a 0.5 chance. Futher suppose you prefer more oranges
to fewer oranges in the range of zero to eight oranges. If
24
you are indifferent between these two options, (three
oranges for sure versus the lottery) then you would be
classified as a risk averse individual according to the
Pratt-Arrow definition of risk aversion. Thus, the economic
explanation of risk aversion is that each additional dollar
is worth slightly less due to satiation (decreasing marginal
value)
.
Imagine two individuals with equal wealth and
identical tastes for consumables. One is timid, nervous,
and full of self-doubt; the other is outgoing,
self-confident, and with a sense of purpose. We might
suppose that the latter will be less risk averse than the
former. Indeed, his relative risk attitude, in the sense of
Dyer and Sarin (1982) (8), may even be risk prone.
2.6.3 Characteristics And Types Of Utility Function
Several types, or classes, of utility functions can be
distinguished, although there are utility functions not
falling into any of the classes to be described. The
utility functions depicted in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 rise
consistently from the lower left to the upper right side of
the chart. That is, the utility curves have positive slopes
throughout their extent. This is a general characteristic
of utility functions; it simply implies that people
ordinarily attach greater utility to a larger sum of money
than to a smaller sum. Economists have noted this
25
UTILITY
^ _^ MONEY$-100 $0 $100
Figure 2.1. Utility curve for a "Risk-Avoider"
(Concave Function)
UTILITY
MONEY
$-100 $0 $100
Figure 2.2. Utility curve for a "Risk-Taker"
(Convex Function)
UTILITY
--— 1 T V MONEY$-100 $0 Tfoo
Figure 2.3. Utility curve for an individual who is
neutral to risk (Linear Function)
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psychological trait in traditional demand theory and have
referred to it as a "positive marginal utility for money".
The curve shown in Figure 2.1 illustrates the utility
curve of an individual who has a diminishing marginal
utility for money, although the marginal utility is always
positive. Mathematically, this type of utility function is
called a concave function and is characteristic of a
"risk-avoider"
.
A person characterized by such a utility
curve would prefer a small but certain monetary gain to a
gamble whose expected monetary value is greater but may
involve a large but unlikely gain, or a large and not
unlikely loss.
In Figure 2.2 is shown the utility curve for a
"risk-taker". This type of person willingly accepts gambles
that have a smaller expected monetary value than an
alternative payoff received with certainty. For such an
individual, the attractiveness of a possible the gamble
tends to outweigh the fact that the probability of such a
payoff may indeed by very small. Mathematically, this type
of function is called convex function.
The linear function shown in Figure 2.3 depicts the
behavior of a person who is "neutral" or "indifferent" to
risk. For such a person every increase of, say, $1,000 has
an associated constant increase in utility and thus he is
neither a risk-avoider nor a risk-taker. This type of
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individual would use the criterion of maximizing expected
monetary value in decision-making problems, because this
would also maximize expected utility.
To see why these terms, "risk-avoider" , "risk-taker"
and "risk neutral", aptly describe the curves, consider the
following bet:
you win $100 with probability 0.5 and you lose $100 with
probability 0.5. This can be thought of as a bet of $100 on
the toss of a fair coin. In terms of expected payoff, you
should be indifferent about the bet since it has an expected
payoff of zero. In terms of expected utility, however, the
decision as to whether or not to take the bet depends on the
shape of your utility function.
In Figure 2.1 through 2.3, the gain denoted by G in
utility if the bet is won is
a = £7(100) - c/(0)
and the loss denoted by L in utility if the bet is lost is
L = y(0) - c;(-ioo)
The expected utility denoted by EU of the bet is
EC/(bet) = 0.5C;(100) + 0.5t/(-100)
The alternative action is not to bet, and the expected
utility of this is just
EU(not bet) = [/(O)
Under what circumstances would you take the bet ? Using the
expected utility rules, you would take the bet if
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EUlbet) > EU(not bet);
that is, if
EU{het) - Emnot bet) > 0.
But from the above equations,
EU(.het) - EU(not bet)
= 0.5C;(100) + 0.5C/(-100) - U{0)
The right-hand side of this equation can be written as
0.5U(100) + 0.5i;(-100) - 0.5C/{0)- 0.5t;(0)
which is equal to
[0.5t/(100) - 0.5y(0)] - [0.5a(0) - 0.5U(-100)]
= 0.5C - 0.5L
= 0.b{G-L).
Therefore, the decision rule is as follows:
Ta)ie the bet if 0.5(G-L) > 0.
Do not take the bet if 0.5(G-L) < 0.
In order to malce the decision in this example, you need only
lool? at the sign of G-L.
For the curve in Figure 2.1, G is smaller than L, so
that (G-L) is negative, and you should not take the bet.
Since you will not take a bet with an expected monetary
payoff of zero, you are called a "risk-avoider" . In fact,
with this curve it is possible to find some bets with
expected monetary payoffs greater than zero that you would
consider unfavorable in terms of expected utility.
In Figure 2.2, G is greater than L, and as a result you
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should take the bet. Furthermore, there are some bets with
negative expected monetary payoffs that you would consider
to be favorable bets. As a result, this curve represents
the utility function of a "risk-taker".
Finally, G = L in Figure 2.3. In this case you are
indifferent between taking the bet and not taking it, and
thus you are neither a risk-avoider nor a risk-taker. For a
person with a linear utility function (that is, the curve is
a straight line) , maximizing expected utility is equivalent
to maximizing expected monetary payoff.
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CHAPTER III
THE DISAPPOINTMENT MODEL
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Most financial decision analyses presume that if two
consequences have the same dollar outcomes they will be
equally preferred, implying that the requisite of
decision analyses is that two identically attractive
consequences have to be the same utility values and vice
versa. For most people it is apparent that they will feel
much happier when they win the top prize of SIO.OOO in a
lottery than when they receive the lowest prize of $10,000
in a lottery. There exists a psychological reaction — dis-
appointment — in such lottery. The satisfaction you feel
with the prize you win in a lottery will directly depend
upon your expectations.
3.2 DISAPPOINTMENT IN DECISION PROBLEM
In order to reward your outstanding performance over
the past year, your boss decides to give you a $5,000 bonus.
If you never expected a bonus, you will be excited to get
it. However, if you expected a $10,000 bonus, you will
naturally be disappointed. The disappointment is a psycho-
logical reaction caused by comparing the actual outcome of a
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lottery to your prior expectations. The higher your
expectations, the greater will be your disappointment.
Of course, there are many other "reference effect"
situations. Although a $5,000 bonus perhaps exceeds your
expectations, it still causes the disappointment to learn
that your colleague got a $10,000 bonus. Consequently, it
is apparent that the most influential reference point is the
status quo of the decision maker.
We recognize that a decision maker will tend to make
economic tradeoffs to remove the possibility of disappoint-
ment in a transaction. People who are particularly hostile
to disappointment may adopt a pessimistic outlook on the
future. If you are given a 50-50 lottery between $1,000 and
$0, you have a 0.5 chance that you will feel disappointed
when the lottery is resolved. Consequently, you may prefer
to exchange the lottery for a sure $400; decreasing marginal
values can remove the possibility of disappointment. The
amount that you are willing to pay to avoid having to take
the bet, $100, is a risk premium.
Of course, people who feel that the "thrill of winning"
is worth potential enjoyment may adopt the opposite action.
Generally speaking, disappointment is a psychological
reaction to an outcome that does not match up to the prior
expectations. The greater the disparity, the greater the
disappointment
.
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3.3 PARADOXES OF THE SUBSTITUTION PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY
THEORY
The substitution principle is key to the derivation of
expected utility theory. This principle is used to investi-
gate inconsistency in preference orderings . We will use the
examples of Kahneman and Tversky (13) (1979) both to
illustrate the violations of the substitution principle of
utility theory and to show that a disappointment model
provides an explanation for them. These examples are based
on Maurice Allais (1). The number of respondents who
answered the problems is denoted by N, and is abstracted
from the original examples of Kahneman and Tversky. The
percentage of subjects who choose each option is shown in
brackets. The symbol (x, p) stands for a lottery where the
player wins x dollars with probability p and wins nothing
with probability 1-p.
Problem 1 : Choose between
A : ($4,000, 0.8) and B : ($3,000, 1) N = 95
(20% chose this) (80% chose this)
Problem 2 : Choose between
C : ($4,000, 0.2) and D : ($3,000, 0.25) N = 95
(65% chose this) (35% chose this)
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show the representation of problem 1 and
2 as decision trees. The symbol, *, in the figures shows
the preferred choice of a majority of subjects. The symbol
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square ( Q ) represents a node where the decision maker
must decide which branch to choose depending upon the
criterion for selection. The symbol circle (Q) represents
a chance node, where each branch coming out from the node
has an ascertainable probability of occurance.
To summarize:
I I represents an action (of the decision maker)
Q represents an event (of the state of the nature)
Note that C = ($4,000, 0.2) can be represented as
(A, 0.2) and D = ($3,000, 0.25) as (B, 0.25). Over half the
respondents didn't obey the expected utility theory. In
order to explain that the preferences in problem 1 and 2 are
not compatible with the theory, we assume that u(0) = 0, and
the option of B implies
u($3,000) > (0.8) 1J(S4,000)
,
whereas the option of C implies
(0.2) u($4,000) > (0.25) u($3, 000)
which is the reverse inequality of the option B. The
substitution principle of utility theory asserts that if B
is preferred to A, then any probability mixture (B, p) must
be preferred to the probability mixture (A, p) . Evidently,
the subjects violate this principle. It is apparent that
reducing the probability of winning from 1.0 to 0.25 has a
greater influence than reducing it from 0.8 to 0.2.
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^<
0.8
S 4000
0.2
S
$ 3000
Figure 3.1. The representation of problem 1 as a decision
tree
0.2
O.i
<
0.75
0.25
S 4000
$
S 3000
$
Figure 3.2. The representation of problem 2 as a decision
tree
Problem 3 ; Consider the following 2-stage game. In the
first stage, the player has a choice between a 0.75 chance
to end the game without winning anything and a 0.25 chance
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to get into the second stage. If the player reaches the
second stage, the options faced are:
E : ($4,000, 0.8) and F : ($3,000, 1) N = 141
(22% chose this) (78% chose this)
This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The symbol, *, in the
figure shows the preference pattern of subjects.
In this problem, there is a probability of
(0.25) (0.80) = 0.20 to win $4,000
and a probability of
(0.25)(1.0) = 0.25 to win $3,000.
Therefore, the final outcomes and probabilities are
($4,000, 0.2) and ($3,000, 0.25),
as in problem 2.
0.8
$ 4000
0.25
-<
0.2
$
0.75
$
$ 3000
Figure 3.3. The representation of problem 3 as a decision
tree
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The result should be the same as that in problem 2. The
essential difference between problems 3 and 2 is whether the
uncertainty is resolved in two stages or one. Explicitly,
people will always agree with the step-by-step logic of the
above analysis but they still feel uncomfortable with the
final conclusion. However, the result in problem 3 is
apparently contrary to the pattern of preference in problem
2. There is an important hypothesis in this report — that
psychological reactions of disappointment play a role in the
informal analysis of decision making but always are ignored
in the rational economic evaluation.
In problem 1, if you accept the gamble and got nothing,
there exists the disappointment that you would feel because
the higher expectation — 0.8 chance to win $4,000 — is
abruptly frustrated. This phenomenon will warn people to
select S3, 000 for sure on the grounds of the basic security.
In problem 2, one does not have much chance to win in either
lottery, so losing is almost to be expected. There is no
great disparity in the disappointment that one would feel at
losing either lottery C and D. Consequently, people may
prefer to choose the $4,000 gamble because of higher
expected monetary value and implications of disappointment
are similar to each lottery. In problem 3, if the player
passes the first stage successfully, then he is likely to
become extremely afraid to lose what he has obtained and his
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expectations rise dramatically.
3.4 PRELIMINARY ASSUMPTIONS
Some authors differentiate between what they call
"decision making under risk" (decision making when the
states of the nature are not known but probabilities for the
various possible states are known) and "decision making
under uncertainty" (decision making when the states of the
nature are not known and probabilities for the various
possible states are not known) . Under the subjective
interpretation of probability, it is always possible to
assign probabilities for the possible events, or states of
the nature (22). Hence, the "risk versus uncertainty"
dichotomy is artificial (in fact, it is nonexistent
according to the subjective interpretation of probability)
,
and in this report any decision-making problem in which the
states of nature are not known for certain is called
decision making under uncertainty.
The word elation is used to describe euphoria — the
opposite of disappointment — associated with an outcome
that exceeds one's prior expectation. These feelings, dis-
appointment and elation, may make decision makers reflect
when considering uncertain alternatives. In order to avoid
unnecessary complication, this report will only consider the
effects of disappointment and elation in decision-making
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problems under uncertainty. It is presumed that decision
makers have constant marginal values for money, they never
suffer from regret, from envy, from other visible or
invisible influences.
It is worth mentioning that reference points such as
status quo, regret, and an assumption of nonconstant
marginal value for money are excluded from the following
analysis, only because their presence would complicate both
the analysis and our understanding of the effect disappoint-
ment has on decision making, not because these factors are
unimportant
.
We will denote by L(x, p, y)an offered lottery having a
probability p of yielding payoff $x and a probability (1-p)
of yielding payoff $y. The expected monetary value (EMV) of
such lottery is px + {l-p)y. It should be emphasized that x
is at least as preferred as y (i.e. x i y) and p is the
probability of winning.
Assumption: (Constant marginal value for payoffs)
It is reasonable to suppose that the prior
expectations for a lottery L (2x, p, 2y) will
be exactly twice those for the lottery
L(x, p, y) . Similarly, the prior expecta-
tions for a lottery L {x+k, p, y+^) would be
an amount k higher than those for the lottery
L(x, p, y) . Figure 3.4 shows these lotteries.
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1-p
L{x, p, y)
$ X
s y
0<
i-p
S 2x
S 2y
Lj^(2x, p, 2y)
S x+A-
1-p
$ y+k
L^lx+A-, p, Y+k)
Figure 3.4. The graph for the considered lotteries
Proof: The EMV of h {2x, p, 2y) is:
2xp + 2y (1-p)
= 2[xp + y (1-p) ]
= 2 [EMV of L{x, p, y) ]
.
The EMV of L^ (x+A-, p, Y+k) is (x+A-jp + (y+A) (1-p) .
The difference between L(x, p, y) and L (.x+A, p, y+/r)
is:
[(x+A-)p+ (y+A-)(l-p)] - [xp + y(l-p)]
= px + pA + y - py + A - pk - px - y + py
= Jt
40
3.5 THE DISAPPOINTMENT MODEL
The preliminary assumption — constant marginal value
for money — indicates that the decision maker would be risk
neutral if it were not for the effects of psychological
reactions, disappointment and elation. However, the purpose
of this report is to explore the implications of disappoint-
ment and elation in decision-making situations. A
disappointment model built by David E. Bell is represented
as follows.
If someone is offered an unresolved lottery L(x ,p, y) ,
the expected monetary value of L(x, p, y) is px + (l-p)y.
This is shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5. The graph for an unresolved offered lottery
Case 1: When y occurs, it means that one loses the
lottery. The disappointment of a decision maker might be in
direct proportion to the differences between what he got and
what the expected monetary value is. The disappointment
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denoted by D can be quantified as follows. Letting d be a
constant reflecting the degree to which a unit of money
affects the decision maker psychologically (da 0), we can
write:
D = d( EMV - y )
= d\[pK -^ (l-p)y] - yl
= d{pK + y - py - y)
= dp(x-y) (1)
Case 2: when x occurs, it means that one wins the
lottery. The sense of elation of a decision maker is
presumed to be in direct proportion to the difference
between what he got and the expected monetary value. The
elation denoted by E can be quantified as follows. Letting
e be a constant reflecting the degree to which a unit money
won affects the decision maker psychologically (e ^ 0), we
can write:
£ = e{ X - EMV )
= elx - [px + (l-p)y] I
= e(x - px - y + py)
= e(l-p) (x-y) (2)
Thus disappointment and elation have been defined as
positive quantities describing reverse psychological
reactions. Hence, equations (1) and (2) are actually
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identical in structure and constants e and d have been
allowed to be different. Following Bell's treatment, the
utility value of the decision maker's multiattribute
preferences over dollars and disappointment (or elation)
should be positive linear and additive transformation:
Total utility = Economic Payoff +. Psychological Reaction
= EMV + [pE + n-p) [-D)]
= EMV + [pE - n-p)D] (3)
where psychological reaction is positive for elation and
negative for disappointment.
Consider the following three special cases:
Case 1: If p = then
D = d-0- (x-y)
= and
E = e(l-O) (x-Y)
= e(x-y)
i.e, there is no chance to win, so losing the
lottery is to be expected and the degree of
disappointment is zero from equation (1).
Case 2: If p = 1 then
D = d-1- (x-y)
= d{x-y) and
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ax"^-
E = e(l-l) (x-y)
=
i.e, the probability of winning is 1, so winning
the lottery is a certain event and the degree of
elation is zero from equation (2)
.
Case 3
:
If c? = e then the psychological reaction in this
lottery will be:
pE + (1-p) (-D)
= p[e(l-p) (x-y)] + (1-p) [-dp(x-y)]
= pe(l-p) (x-y) - dp(l-p) (x-y)
= (1-p) (x-y)p(e-d)
= (1-p) (x-y)p-
=
i.e, the psychological reaction, disappointment
and elation, are identically compelling in such
lottery, and they cancel each other when talking
expectations. The disappointment and elation do
not affect in decision making in this case but
they still play an important role in inducing
the desirability of individual outcomes.
3.6 ILLUSTRATION OF THE DISAPPOINTMENT MODEL
One of the purposes of this report is to investigate
the implications of disappointment and elation in
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decision-making problems. In an unresolved lottery, if a
decision maker experiences disappointment more than elation,
i.e, d > e, then according to equation (3) the certainty
equivalent (CE) of this lottery should be:
CE = EMV + Psychological Reaction
= [px + (l-p)y] + [pE + (l-p)(-D)]
= px + (l-p)y + (e-d)p{l-p) (x-y) (4)
Consider a special "unit" lottery L(l, p, 0) for which
CE = Ip + O(l-p) + (e-d)p(l-p) (1-0)
= p + (e-d)p(l-p)
where e - d < 0. The surprising result is that the decision
maker has decreasing marginal value for money. Figure 3.6
shows the marginal values for money against the probability
of winning. Although the preliminary assumption of the
disappointment model is constant marginal value for money,
it leads to risk-averse behavior by the decision maker when
a relative aversion to disappointment over elation (say d >
e ) exists. According to the principles of utility theory,
the utility function of this lottery can be deduced as
follows:
For the implicit definition: By the linearity of money
for lottery L(l, p, 0), and assuming that
u(0) = 0, u(l) = 1,
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let u(L) be the utility value of such a lottery. Then
ij(L) = pu{x) + (1-p) u(y)
= pud) + (1-p) u(0)
= pud)
u(L) = p
Then the certainty equivalent CE is defined by
u(L) = u{CE) , so that
u(CE) = u[p + (e-d)pd-p)]
= P
For the explicit definition:
Let CE = p + (e-d)p(l-p) = X (say), and what we have
to do is to solve for the value of u{X)
Extend the equation and let d-e = K. Then
p + (e-d)p(l-p) = X
p - Kpd-p) - X =
p - Kp + Kp^ - X =
which leads to
(K-1) + / (1-K)^ + 4KX
2K
u(X) = p = (K-1) ./ (1-K) + 4KAr
2K
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1.0 Probability
Figure 3.6. Marginal Values for money against the
probability of winning
1 .0 MONET
Figure 3-7. Utility function for money
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Figure 3.7 graphs the utility function of this lottery.
According to this utility function, we can conclude that
it is increasing for s X s 1 (d-e < 1),
it is a concave function (d > e)
,
it displays decreasing risk aversion and the risk primium of
this function is always greater than (22).
A premise we may obtain is that if a decision maker can
not model the formulation of expectations explicitly, then,
at least implicitly, the expectations are linear in the
payoffs and for a given probability of winning, p, dis-
appointment and elation are proportional to the difference
between outcomes and expectations. Otherwise, the marginal
values for money should be the type of Figure 3.7, i.e,
showing decreasing marginal values for money. The pre-
liminary assumption, constant marginal value for payoffs,
discussed in Section 3.4 is important here.
Consider the previous discussion for the paradoxes of
substitution principle of utility theory in Section 3.3,
since the decision makers do not always follow the principle
based on expected monetary values alone, it is reasonable
to inject the ideas of disappointment and elation.
For the four alternatives used in problems 1, 2 and 3,
the certainty equivalents for each alternative can be
calculated by using equation (4) and they are shown in Table
3.1.
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lottery L(x, p, y) CE for each lottery
L^(3,000, 1, 0) 3000
L2(4,000, 0.8, 0) 3200 + 640- (e-d)
LjO.OOO, 0.25, 0) 750 + 563- (e-d)
L^(4,000, 0.2, 0) 800 + 640- (e-d)
Table 3.1. Certainty equivalents for the considered
alternatives
1. For L (3,000, 1, 0), we have
CE = px + (l-p)y + (e-d)p(l-p) (x-y)
= 1-3000 + (1-1)0 + (e-d)l(l-l) (3000-0)
= 3000
2. For L, (4,000, 0.8, 0), we have
CE = (0.8)4000 + (1-0.8)0 + ( e-d) (0 . 8 ) (1-0 . 8 ) (4000-0)
= 3200 + 640(e-d)
3. For L^ (3,000, 0.25, 0), we have
CE = (0.25)3000 + (1-0.25)0 + ( e-d) (0 . 25) (1-0 . 25) 3000
= 750 + 563 (e-d)
4. For L (4,000, 0.2, 0), we have
CE = (0.2)4000 + (1-0.2)0 + ( e-d) (0 . 2 ) ( 1-0 . 2 ) 4000
= 800 + 640(e-d)
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According to the preference patterns of the empirical obser-
vation, L. (3,000, 1, 0) is preferred to L,(4,000, 0.8, 0)
and L^(4,000, 0.2, 0) is preferred to LjO.OOO, 0.25, 0),
leading to the following two inequalities,
3000 > 3200 + 640- (e-d)
and
800 + 640- (e-d) > 750 + 563- (e-d) ' .
Solving these two inequalities we got a range for the values
of d-e, i.e,
0.3125 < d-e < 0.6494
which means that d is greater than e. Quantities inside
this range will also support the empirically observed rank
orders
.
A common ratio effect for the behavioral rule derived
by Kahneman and Tvers){y (13) is shown below.
For X > y > and any < r < 1, if a lottery of
L(x, q, 0) is equally preferred (denoted by «») with a
lottery of L(y, p, 0), then the lottery of L(x, qr, 0) is
preferred to the lottery of L(y, pr, 0), i.e,
L(x, qr, 0) •• L(y, pr, 0) .
Proof: If L(x, q, 0) -o, L(y, p, 0)
using the equations (3) and (4), we have
qx + (e-d)g(l-g)x = py + (e-d)p(l-p)y (5)
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In order to prove that L(x, gr, 0) » L(y, pr, 0)
,
then we must have an inequality of the form:
xgr + (e-d) gr(l-gr)x > ypr + ( e-d) pr(l-pr) y (6)
2Multiply (5) by r and get:
gr^x + (e-d)g(l-g)xr^ = pr^y + ( e-d) p(l-p)yr^
Substract this equality from (6) then
LHS = gxr(r-l) (1 + e-d)
and
RHS = pyr(r-l) (1+e-d) .
The inequality obtained is LHS >RHS. i.e,
gxr{r-l) (1+e-d) > pyr(r-l) (1+e-d) (7)
If it is true then gx > py, which implies that
L(x, gr, 0) » L(y, pr, 0).
The equality (5) also indicates that the inequality (7) will
be true if
1 + {e-d)(l-g) < 1 + (e-d)(l-p)
,
-
and if
(e-d) Ip-g) < 0.
Proof: From (5), gx + (e-d)g(l-g)x = py + (e-d)p(l-p)y
=» gx[l + (e-d)(l-g)] = py[l + (e-d)(l-p)]
If gx > py is true then
1 + (e-d)(l-g) < 1 + (e-d)(l-p)
Sequentially extend the above inequality:
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(e-d) (l-g) < (e-d) (1-p)
(e-d) [(l-<7) - (1-p)] <
,
(e-d) (^g) <
Because d > e and e-d < 0, it implies that p-g > 0,
i .e, p > g.
Example: Two lotteries shown in Figure 3.8 are
L(4,000, 0.8, 0) and L(3,000, 1, 0). We have seen
that they are equally preferred between each
other. For r = 0.25, x = 4000 > y = 3000, and
gx = 4000(0.8) = 3200 is greater than py = 3000-1
= 3000, and p = 1 > g= 0.8, a new lottery
L(4,000, 0.2, 0), where 0.2 = (0.8) (0.25), will be
preferred to another new lottery L{3,000, 0.25, 0) .
The combined lottery is shown in Figure 3.9, where
the symbol, *, indicates the empirically observed
preference. Thus the common ratio effect supports
the empirical observation and explains why people
selected a lottery which violated the substitution
principle of utility theory.
A conclusion from the above example can be obtained:
If L(x, q, 0) «» L(y, p, 0) then as long as
1
.
<jx > py and
2. p > g
then L(x, gr, 0) » L(y, pr, 0).
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S 4000 S 3000
0.2
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Figure 3.8. The representations of lotteries
L(4,000, 0.8, 0) and L(3,000, 1, 0)
n<
0.2
0.
0.25
0.75
$ 4000
S
$ 3000
S
Figure 3.9. The combination lottery of L(4,000, 0.8, 0) and
L(3,000, 1, 0)
Note that no matter what d and e are, using equation
(4) the quantity ( d-e) p(l-p) (x-y) which are psychological
reactions, disappointment and elation, can be treated as a
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measure of the risk involved in the lottery. It is ulti-
mately the reduction part in equation (4) caused by the
existence of uncertainty. This measure reflects the effects
of decreasing marginal values for money. There are many
well-known literature sources, such as Stone's parameters'
family (18), the variance measure of risk by Pratt (15)
which discuss this matter.
3.7 VERIFYIMG THE DISAPPOINTMENT MODEL
There are four lotteries shown in Figure 3.10 to
inspect the disappointment model represented in the fore-
going sections. The expected monetary values in these
lotteries are all same, $1,000. Using equation (1), the
disappointment on losing the lottery, i.e, on receiving SO,
will be the same quantity, lOOOd, in all four lotteries.
For example, the disappointment in lottery L. should be:
dp(x-y)
= d(O.l) (10000-0)
= lOOOd.
However, according to the actual observation, the
probability of winning in lottery L., 0.999, is large enough
that one can almost be convinced that he will win the
lottery. Therefore, people may observe that the disappoint-
ment in the fourth lottery, L. (1,001, 0.999, 0), should be
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the largest one among all four cases, and the order of their
disappoint- ment should be L
.
, L,, L_ and L . The most
important thing that we need to know for this disappointment
model is whether the levels of disappointment in these
lotteries are the same or not.
0.1
•( 0.9
- $
0.5
S 2000
0.5
S
Lj^dO.OOO, 0.1, 0) L2(2,000, 0.5, 0)
0.9 0.999
S 1111 , S 1001
0( 0(\ 0.1 \ 0.001
^ S ^ S
Ljd.lll, 0.9, 0) L^d.OOl, 0.999, 0)
Figure 3.10. Four lotteries are used to inspect the
disappointment model
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simultaneously, consider another test for the elation
model. It is represented in Figure 3.11 which contains the
same top prize of SIO.OOO and the expected monetary values
are all same, $9,000. Using equation (2), the elation on
winning the lottery, i.e, on receiving $10,000, should be
the same quantity, lOOOe, in all four lotteries.
For example, the elation in lottery L. should be:
e(l-p) (x-y)
= e(l - 0.9) (10000-0)
= lOOOe
$ 10000
0.5
/
0.5
- $ 8000
Lj^(10,000, 0.9, C) L2(10,000, 0.5, 8,000)
0.001
S 10000
0.999
$ 8999
LjdCOOO, 0.1, 8,888) L (10,000, 0.001, 8,999)
Figure 3.11. Four lotteries are used to inspect the
elation model
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similarly, the probability of losing in lottery L., 0.999,
is so large, that is to be expected to lose. Therefore, the
elation in the fourth lottery, L. (10,000, 0.001, 8,999),
should be the largest one among these four cases and the
order of their elation should be L., L,, L. and L.
.
The above discussion shows that psychological
reactions, disappointment and elation, may depend not only
upon a level of prior expectations, but also in a direct way
upon the probability with which the outcome will occur.
Since there is no formal model that can be constructed
accurately for the psychological reactions, disappointment
and elation, in all various circumstances, it should be
emphasized that the simple model expressed by equations (1),
(2), (3) and (4) just interprets that the psychological
reactions, disappointment and elation, can be considered and
be modeled systematically in decision situations. The
expression of expectations is not unique, even for a
specific individual. It may differ from person to person.
A pessimist may have lower expectations, but an optimist may
expect more. A mathematician may expect the probabilities
of occurance for every outcome, but a business man maybe
expects greater payoffs for each outcome. Different
individuals have different expectations. It is understand-
able that in circular decision situations decision makers
may spend much time to determine their decisions.
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3.8 PREFEREHCE MODEL INVOLVING DISAPPOINTMENT (AND ELATION)
The discussion in the previous sections indicates that
disappointment and elation depend not only upon the formed
expected payoffs, but also directly upon the probabilities
involved. There is a preference model originated by
Kahneman and Tversky in their prospect theory (13) and
developed by David Bell which captures the above concepts.
We will denote an offered unresolved lottery by
Lp(x, p, y) , an outcome x resulting from L. (x, p, y) by
L. {x, p, y) and an outcome y resulting from L (x, p, y) by
Ljfx, p, y) . Let C. (x, p, y) be the certainty equivalents
of the situations L.(x, p, y) (i = 0, 1, 2). It means
that C (x, p, y) represents the certainty equivalent of
traditional utility theory for the unresolved lottery
Lq(x, p, y) , where C.(x, p, y) and C_(x, p, y) are the cash
equivalents for the outcomes.
If there is no considerations of psychological
reactions, — disappointment and elation —
^n'^' P' ^^
should be the following expression and the relationship of
C. (x, p, y) is shown in Figure 3.12.
Cq(x, p, y) = pC^ix, p, y) + (l-pjCjCx, p, y)
The foregoing expression derives from our preliminary
assumption of constant marginal values for money. This
situation can be called "Risk Neutrality in the Absence of
Disappointment and Elation" .
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S X > Cj^(x, p, y)
/ \ 1-P
I—
I
^ S y > ^2^^' P' ^'
Figure 3.12. The representation of cash equivalents for
C. (X, p, y) (i = 0, 1 and 2)
By using the concept of constant marginal value for
payoffs, a theorem derived by Kahneman and Tversky (13) and
used by David Bell (4) is shown below:
Theorem : For i = 0, 1 and 2, the situations L.(x, p, y)
have certainty equivalents of y + (x-y)Ti,(p) for
some functions n. (p) .
Proof : C^(x, p, y) = y + C.(x-y, p, y-y)
= y + C^ (x-y, p, 0)
= y + (x-y)C^(l, p, 0)
= y + (x-y)n^ (p)
n^(p) takes the place of C^(l, p, 0) and stands for a
behavioral subjective probability.
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To summarize:
y + (x-y)"(.(p) is the certainty equivalent of the
unresolved situation.
y + (x-yj/i. (p) is the certainty equivalent of the
winning situation.
y + (x-y) n {p) is the certainty equivalent of the
losing situation.
It is worth mentioning that n. (p) is not a conventional
probability but can be applied to the traditional utility
model, called !j(x)
,
as a behavioral value.
Generally speaking, a lottery L(x, p, y) is divided
into two components:
(1) the riskless component, i.e. the minimum gain or loss
which has more chance to be obtained or paid.
(2) the risky component, i.e. the additional gain or loss
which is actually at stake.
The value of such lottery equals the value of the riskless
component, i.e. y, plus the value difference between the
outcomes, i.e. x-y, multiplied by the weight associated with
the more extreme outcome
.
For example: the value of a lottery L(400, 0.25, 100) is:
100 + 71 (0.25) (400-100) = 100 + 300ir(0.25)
We will substitute "(p) for ".(p), w(p) for t l.p} and
lip) for n {p) . The function w(p) represents the value of
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psychological gains, elation, that comes with winning in the
lottery L(l, p, 0). The function Up) represents the value
of psychological losses, disappointment, that comes with
losing in the lottery L(l, p, 0) . A flexible model
represented in Figure 3.13 can be expressed as follows:
Cp(x, p, y) = y + (x-y)K(p)
C (x, p, y) = y + (x-y) w(p)
C^lx, p, y) = y + (x-y)J(l-p)
1-p
,
w(p) > E
Up) or -J(l-p) • • > D
nip)
Figure 3.13. The representation of the lottery L(l, p, 0)
involving functions "(p), wip) and J(p).
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There are three properties for the functions k, w and 1.
(1) Because of sure-thing indifference, for i = and 1,
L. (x, p, x) is equally preferred to L. (x, 1, y) and
for i = and 2, L. (y, p, y) is equally preferred to
L. (x, 0, y) . To summarize, we have
n(0) = wU) = 2(1) =
n{l) = w(0) = 2(0) = 1
(2) For a quantity q, if p > q, then
Lq(x, p, y) is preferred to Lj.(x, q, y)
and
Lj(x, g, y) is preferred to L. (x, p, y)
.
It means that n is a increasing function of p, w and
2 are decreasing functions of p. It is shown in
Figure 3.14.
(3) C|j(x, p, y) = pC^ix. p, y) + (l-p)C2(x, p, y)
y + (x-y)n(p) = p[y + (x-y)w(p)] +
(1-p) ty + (x-y)i(l-p)]
y + (x-y)n(p) = py + p(x-y) w(p) + y - py -
(x-y)2(l-p) + p(x-y)2(l-p)
t(p) = p + pwip) - (l-p)2(l-p)
It means that the certainty equivalent of an un-
resolved lottery L(x, p, y) can be represented by
the above equation.
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1.0 Probability
w(p) or l(p)
1 -
q P 1.0 Probability
Figure 3.14. (a) Increasing function TCCp) and
(b) decreasing function v(p) and l(p)
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People may find that the disappointment model
introduced in Section 3.5 is a special case for using the
foregoing model. Therefore, this preference model is very
flexible for purposes of our study — an investigation of
the effects of psychological reactions.
Using equation (4),
CE = EMV + Psychological Reaction
n(p) = [Ip + O(l-p)] + [p- E + (l-p)-(-D)]
i(p) = p + (e-d) p- (1-p) (1-0)
Tip) = p + p{e-d) - p le-d)
n(p) =p+pe-pe- pd + p d
n(p) = p + pte(l-p)] - p[d(l-p)]
n(p) = p + pwlp) - pUp)
nip) = p + pwip) - (l-p)J(l-p)
We can show that wip) = (l-p)e, '
lip) = (l-p)d and
nip) = p[l + (e-d) (l-p)] .
Therefore, the disappointment model is really fit for the
preference model.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Utility theory is often criticized because it fails to
predict actual behavior for some quite straightforward
comparisons between alternatives with uncertain consequences
(5). It is understandable why decision makers may be
skeptical of expected utility analysis as a prescriptive
tool when it apparently fails even for some simple
comparisons
.
We may observe that decision makers often agree with
the logical procedure of decision analysis but feel un-
comfortable at an intuitive level with its implications.
Far from encouraging departure from traditional economic
analysis, all the discussions of this report may explain
that what is currently omitted from expected utility
analysis deserves to be omitted and that what psychological
reactions should be concerned in forcing economically
inefficient decisions.
The concept of psychological reaction — disappointment
— is integrated into utility theory in a prescriptive
model (4). This studied model is perfectly adaptable to the
case of nonconstant marginal values for money, by making an
appropriate transformation of the attribute scale.
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For many decision analyses, it is easy to understand
that any quantitative analysis must explain the various
conflicting objectives of the decision maker. Psychological
reaction is an appropriate objective that should be included
in any decision analysis if the decision maker considers it
as a criterion for decision. In particular, a consumer may
wish to spend some dollars in avoiding disappointment, an
aspect of risk aversion that doesn't seem to be reflected by
a utility function over dollar assets alone.
By using normative analyses, it merely indicates that
the psychological behavior is the logical result of such an
objective. The psychological impacts of a decision are
generated by the same thought process used in making a
decision, namely that the value of an outcome is judged
relative to various reference points such as status quo,
foregone assets, and prior expectations (4).
If we are interested only in the effects of disappoint-
ment on decision making, then only the function n need be
assessed, which may be done by the obvious mechanism of
asking directly for certainty equivalents for the gambles
(1, p, 0) .
However, it would be important, in any prescriptive
analysis that incorporates disappointment, for the
assessment procedure to require explicit tradeoffs between
psychology and economy. Assessment of the functions w and 1
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requires the decision maker to compare outcomes (and the
psychological consequences that go with them.) instead of
alternatives .
Explicitly, the disappointment model captures the idea
that people's reaction to decision outcomes is a function
not only of the absolute value of their payoff, but also to
the change in their expectations and to the likelihood of
such outcomes. Thus, we have looked at the implications of
disappointment for decision making in standard situations
including violations of the substitution principle.
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ABSTRACT
This report investigates the implications of using
disappointment as a criterion in a decision-making problem.
This procedure was developed after the concept of regret in
decision analysis. Utility theory is often criticized
because it fails to predict actual behavior for some quite
straightforward comparisons between alternatives with
uncertainty consequences.
A simple model of David E. Bell incorporating
disappointment is introduced, which offers an explanation
for systematic violations of the substitution principle of
utility theory and investigates the behavioral implications
for a decision maker. Under the basic assumptions for this
report, the resulting preferance model is shown. This model
permits a straightforward assessment task on the part of the
decision makers.
This report is a study of descriptive behavior to force
recognition of the importance of psychological impacts to
the decision maker.
